Green Taxes and Double Dividends in a Dynamic Economy by Glomm, Gerhard et al.
 
 
 
 
CAEPR Working Paper 
#2006-017 
 
 
 
Green Taxes and Double Dividends in a 
Dynamic Economy 
 
Gerhard Glomm 
Indiana University Bloomington 
 
Daiji Kawaguchi 
Hitotsubashi University 
 
and 
 
Facundo Sepulveda 
Universidad de Santiago de Chile 
 
November 8, 2006 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network 
electronic library at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=943494. 
 
The Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research resides in the Department of Economics 
at Indiana University Bloomington.  CAEPR can be found on the Internet at: 
http://www.indiana.edu/~caepr. CAEPR can be reached via email at caepr@indiana.edu or 
via phone at 812-855-4050. 
 
©2006 by Gerhard Glomm, Daiji Kawaguchi and Facundo Sepulveda. All rights reserved. 
Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit 
permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. 
Green taxes and double dividends in
a dynamic economy
Gerhard Glomm
Economics Department
Indiana University at Bloomington
Daiji Kawaguchi
Institute of Social and Economic Research
Osaka University
Facundo Sepulveda
Facultad de Economı´a y Administracio´n
Universidad de Santiago de Chile 1, 2
November 7, 2006
1Corresponding author: Facundo Sepulveda, Departamento de Gestio´n y
Pol´ıticas Pu´blicas, FAE. Universidad de Santiago. Alameda Libertador B.
O’Higgins 3363. Santiago. Chile. Email: facundo.sepulveda@anu.edu.au
2We are thankful to Steve Cassou, Joseph Haslag, Thomas Renstro¨m, Akihito
Asano, Jean Christophe Pereau and participants at the MSU macroeconomics
study group for their helpful comments. All remaining errors are our responsibility.
Abstract
This paper examines a revenue neutral green tax reform along the lines of
the Double Dividend hypothesis. Using a dynamic general equilibrium model
calibrated to the US economy, we find that increasing gasoline taxes and using
the revenue to reduce capital income taxes does indeed deliver both types
of welfare gains: from higher consumption of market goods ( an efficiency
dividend), and from a better environmental quality (a green dividend), even
though in the new steady state environmental quality may worsen. We also
find that, given the available evidence on how much households are willing
to pay for improvements in air quality, the size of the green dividend is very
small in absolute magnitude, and much smaller than the efficiency dividend.
1 Introduction
Green tax reform has become a major policy issue in the OECD countries,
no doubt as a response to important environmental issues such as the protec-
tion of the ozone layer, local air quality, biodiversity loss, acid rain and global
warming. A number of countries such as Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom, Finland, Norway, Germany and Italy all have imple-
mented explicit environmental tax reforms.
The stakes are large. Tax revenues raised from green taxes average about
2% of GDP in OECD countries, but exceed 4% of GDP in some countries.
According to Baker and Elkins [2003], the estimates of the impact on U.S.
GDP by complying with the Kyoto Protocol vary between a decrease of about
2.5% and an increase of 3% of GDP. This range of 5.5% of the GDP is due, at
least in part, to differing policy instruments considered and different model-
ing assumptions used. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (in
IPCC [2001]) asserts that, in order to comply with the prescribed limits of
the Kyoto Protocol, the carbon tax required in the U.S. would be associated
with a 0.45% to 1.96% decrease in GDP by the year 2010. This result is
obtained under the assumption that the new green tax revenues would be
distributed in a lump-sum fashion.
Most of the studies discussed above focus on the effects of introducing
new environmental taxes. We believe that this raises important public choice
concerns: it is hard to see that substantial new environmental taxes would be
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acceptable politically, if they bring about sizeable losses in terms of average
income. It is interesting to note that in a poll conducted in the U.S. in 1998,
70% of respondents were in favor of an increase in energy taxes if the extra tax
revenue were to be used to decrease pre-existing income or payroll taxes (see
International Communications Research [1998]). These results indicate that
revenue recycling, that is, using new revenues from green taxes to decrease
pre-existing distortionary taxes, may make green taxes politically feasible.
Revenue recycling raises the possibility that green tax reform may yield
a double dividend. The Double Dividend Hypothesis is nicely exposited
in Goulder [1995a] and Bovenberg [1999]. Apart from increasing welfare
due to lower pollution externalities, a ’green’ dividend, environmental taxes
raise revenue that can be used to lower other pre-existing tax distortions,
resulting in welfare gains from a smaller deadweight loss of the tax system,
or ’efficiency’ dividend. Because of its appealing nature, environmental tax
reform has been labeled a ’no regret option.’ This paper examines the effects
of a particular environmental tax reform in the U.S. along the lines of the
Double Dividend Hypothesis.
For policy purposes there are two strands of literature that are of direct
relevance to this paper, one is normative, the other is positive. The first
strand is concerned with what is the optimal tax structure. In particular, it
examines whether in the presence of preexisting distortions, the optimal en-
vironmental tax lies above its Pigovian level. Here, the distortionary effect of
increasing green taxes above the level at which the marginal pollution dam-
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age is internalized should be compared to the efficiency gains from reducing
other taxes. In an influential paper, Bovenberg and de Mooij [1994] exam-
ine whether increasing the tax rate on a polluting good from its Pigovian
level, and reducing pre-existing labor taxes in a revenue neutral fashion, will
deliver a welfare gain. Their main finding shows that, although environmen-
tal quality improves, the efficiency dividend does not materialize. In that
model, green taxes turn out to be more distortionary at the margin than
the labor tax, by virtue of their effect on the composition of the production
bundle. This important result has become a stepping stone, and has proved
robust to a number of extensions, including capital accumulation dynamics
(e.g. Bovenberg and Goulder [1996] and Bovenberg and Smulders [1996]). A
second strand of this literature is positive in nature. It asks what are the spe-
cific economic effects of a particular, perhaps hypothetical, policy reform. In
a very influential paper in macroeconomics, Lucas [1990] finds that shifting
capital income taxation completely to labor income taxation has negligible
effects on long-run economic growth in a model of endogenous growth which
is calibrated to the U.S. economy.
In environmental economics, the papers that falls in this category are
Jorgenson and Wilcoxen [1993a] and Jorgenson and Wilcoxen [1993b]. Jor-
genson and Wilcoxen [1993a] estimate a model for the US using post war
data. Simulations from this model suggest that a carbon tax would have
qualitatively different impacts on long-run GDP depending on the preexist-
ing taxes that are reduced. The authors also note that the costs of keeping
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CO2 emissions below predetermined standards would increase with higher
levels of GDP growth. We believe that this is an interesting insight. A
similar theoretical possibility was already mentioned by Koskela and Schob
[1999], and considered in more detail by Bayindir-Upmann and Raith [2003],
who showed that, in a distorted labor market, substituting green taxes for
labor taxes would increase employment and output and have eventually pro-
duce a detrimental effect on the environment. After Jorgenson and Wilcoxen
[1993a], Goulder [1995b] used a calibrated model to consider different tax
recycling policies after a carbon tax was imposed, and found that green tax
reform will invariably reduce the efficiency of the tax system. Finally, Zhang
[1998] uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to assess the macroeconomic
effects of reducing carbon dioxide emissions in China.
The current consensus of the effects of green tax reform is summarized
by Lans Bovenberg in his preface to de Mooij [2000], ”Whereas the second
dividend may be in doubt, the first dividend (i.e. a cleaner environment) re-
mains a powerful reason for the introduction of pollution taxes.” This claim
is strengthened by a report by the OECD [2001] which summarizes the result
of the literature on revenue recycling as follows: In 65% of all simulations
where additional green tax revenues were used to cut social security contri-
butions, GDP rose as a consequence of green tax reform. When extra tax
revenue was used to cut personal income taxes, only 23% of all simulations
resulted in a higher GDP.
For any policy discussion it is absolutely critical to know how the green
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tax revenue is recycled. Much of the literature on the Double Dividend Hy-
pothesis assumes that green tax revenues are recycled through a decrease in
labor taxes. In the models used, labor is often the only primary factor of
production (see Parry [1998], for example for a review). While this assump-
tion may be very sensible in the European context where labor markets are
distorted by a variety of factors, in the U.S. context, where labor markets
are relatively unfettered, it is worthwhile to consider the effects of recycling
the green tax revenue through lower capital income tax rates.
We know from the literature on optimal taxation (see Chamley [1986],
Judd [1987], Jones et al. [1993] and Atkeson and Kehoe [1999]) that under
certain robust conditions the optimal capital tax rate in the long-run is zero.
Since many estimates of the marginal capital income tax rates are positive,
it is extremely compelling for Policy Purposes to consider a green tax re-
form that lowers the pre-existing capital income tax distortion and involves
revenue recycling through lower capital taxation. For purposes of welfare
economics, we know from Lucas [1990] and others that changes in capital
incomes taxation have strong welfare effects.
In this paper, we study the effects on national income, investment, con-
sumption and welfare of a green tax reform that raises a tax on a polluting
good. This tax reform is revenue-neutral; we lower a sizeable pre-existing dis-
tortion by decreasing the capital income tax in order to keep government’s
share of the GDP constant. We consider both the long-run (steady state)
implications and the effects along the transitions. We use a version of the
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Cass-Koopmans economy where output is produced with capital and fuel and
where fuel is produced with capital. In addition to the standard consumption
good, fuel is also a consumption good. Individual utility also depends upon
the stock of health which is inversely related to the stock pollutants, which
is augmented by fuel.
The main results of our paper are based on the response of investment
to changes in the capital tax rate. Empirically, there is now clear evidence
that corporate taxes have strong effects on capital accumulation. Using a
panel of US firms spanning thirty-six years, Cummins et al. [1994] estimate
the responses of investment to changes in corporate taxes, using major tax
reforms as natural experiments. Their results point to large responses of
firm level investment to changes in tax rates. In Cummins et al. [1996], the
authors use the same identifying technique to show that these results are
robust across OECD countries.
This paper contributes to the literature on the Double Dividend Hypothe-
sis in several ways. First, we focus on a very particular tax, namely a gasoline
tax, rather than a general carbon or green tax. In the U.S., gasoline taxes
already exist at the federal and state levels. It is noteworthy that according
to the Green Tax German Memorandum (see FOSEV [2004]) ecotaxes in
Germany entail the least amount of red tape and have the lowest adminstra-
tive costs of all German taxes. Policy changes such as increasing the gasoline
or fuel tax as considered here are thus very easy to implement.
Second, our results are based on a model calibrated to the U.S. economy.
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Our calibration includes two novel features. Most of the literature that uses
calibrated models to study the effects of particular policy reforms uses CES
utility functions (see, for example, Lucas [1990]). Such utility functions do
not match observed price and income elasticities for the demand for gaso-
line. We, thus, consider a wider class of utility functions which are consistent
with these observations. Moreover, we bring into our calibration the large
literature on the valuation of environmental amenities (see, for instance, Free-
man III [1993]). This literature allows for the calibration of preferences for
a cleaner environment and, therefore, for evaluating the environmental and
market effects of green tax policy reform in a unified framework.
Third, our analysis shows the importance of the transition dynamics in
evaluating the welfare effects of tax reform. All along the transition, we
examine the effects that higher levels of capital accumulation resulting from
a lower tax on capital earnings will have on environmental quality as well as o
the other economic variables, a point first raised by Jorgenson and Wilcoxen
[1993a].
Our results show that, because a lower tax rate on capital earnings en-
courages capital accumulation, the new steady state levels of capital and
consumption of the clean good are higher than their pre-reform levels and,
as a result, the quality of the environment may worsen in the new steady
state. However, in all the cases we consider, at the beginning of the transi-
tion a cleaner environment is obtained, and consumption has to be sacrificed
in order to build up capital, so that accounting for transition dynamics is nec-
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essary in order to access the welfare effects of this policy change. Our results
show that both dividends are likely to materialize under relatively general
conditions. We also find that the green dividend, or higher discounted utility
from a cleaner environment, is much smaller - by as much as one order of
magnitude - than the efficiency dividend, or higher discounted utility from
the consumption of market goods. These results are broadly consistent with
those found in the literature. They complement those found in Bovenberg
and de Mooij [1994] and most of the Double Dividend literature in showing
that, given current levels of taxes, a green tax reform of the type examined
here would achieve both dividends. These results also show that once tran-
sitional dynamics are accounted for, the negative impact of growth on the
environment as suggested in Bayindir-Upmann and Raith [2003] is not suffi-
cient to reverse the welfare gains obtained from a better environment quality
at the beginning of the transition, a point on which the policy literature is
silent.
This paper has four other sections. In section 2, the model is presented.
In section 3, functional forms and parameter values are chosen. Section 4
presents the results and section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The model
The economy is populated by a large number of infinitely lived individuals.
We abstract from population growth and normalize population size to unity.
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Preferences of the representative individual are given by
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct,mct;ht), (1)
where ct is consumption of the single perishable consumption good at time
t, mct is the amount of fuel consumed at time t and ht is the state of health
at time t, β is the discount factor which is a real number between zero and
one, and u is felicity. We find it useful here to disaggregate consumption
goods into two types: one good, which is associated with negative pollution
externalities, we call fuel, mct, and the other good, which is not associated
with such externalities we refer to as the consumption good, ct. In the
utility function specified in equation (1) the state of health, ht, enters as a
separate variable. Health here is a stock variable, which is taken as given
by each individual, and depends on the aggregate amount of pollution in the
economy.
The relationship between health and the aggregate amount of pollution,
zt, is given by
ht = h(zt), h
′ < 0 (2)
From a historical perspective, changes in life expectancy and morbid-
ity patterns are more closely linked to economic growth than to changes in
pollution levels. Our specification is motivated by widespread evidence that
pollution levels have a strong impact on morbidity rates, in particular among
children and elderly people (e.g. Schwartz et al. [1994]).
Given that our focus is not on examining the sectoral effects of green tax
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reform, we adopt a simple structure for the production technology of market
goods, and refer the reader to Jorgenson and Wilcoxen [1993a] for a more
disaggregated analysis. The consumption good is produced via a constant
returns to scale technology using two inputs, capital kpt and fuel mpt. The
production function is given by
yt = f(kpt,mpt). (3)
Fuel is produced using capital kmt only, with a production function given by
mt = g(kmt). (4)
There are two stock variables in this economy, physical capital (kt) that can
be used in the production of the consumption good (kpt) or fuel (kmt) (so
kt = kpt + kmt), and the stock of pollution (zt). These two stock variables
evolve according to
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it, (5)
zt+1 = (1− δz)zt +mt, (6)
where it is investment in physical capital at time t. In this economy, fuel mt
can be used as an input in the final goods sector, mpt, or consumed, mct, so
mt = mpt +mct. The initial endowments are k0 and z0.
The government in this economy collects taxes on capital income at the
uniform rate τk, and taxes on household fuel consumption and fuel use by
firms at the rate τm. All tax revenue is rebated in a lump sum fashion to the
households.
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The representative household solves the problem
max
(ct,kt+1,mct)∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct,mct;ht), (7)
subject to
∞∑
t=0
pt(ct + it + (1 + τm)wtmct) =
∞∑
t=0
pt((1− τk)qtkt + pimt + Tt),
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it,
given
k0, {pt, qt, wt, ht}∞t=0,
where pt is the price of final goods at time t, wt is relative price of fuel
compared with final goods at time t, and qt is the return to capital at time t.
Here pimt are profits from producing fuel and Tt are the lump sum transfers
from the government. The final goods producing firm solves the problem
max
{kpt,mpt}
f(kpt,mpt)− qtkpt − (1 + τm)wtmpt. (8)
The fuel producing firm solves the problem
max
{kmt}
wtg(kmt)− qtkmt. (9)
We do not allow the government to run a deficit or surplus, so the gov-
ernment budget constraint each period is
τmwt(mct +mpt) + τkqtkt = Tt. (10)
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An equilibrium for this economy is an allocation for the representative
household {ct,mct, kpt+1, kmt+1}∞t=0, an allocation for the final goods pro-
ducing firm {kpt,mpt}∞t=0, an allocation for the fuel-producing firm {kmt}∞t=0
and prices {wt, qpt, qmt}∞t=0, which together with a sequence of health states
{ht}∞t=0 satisfy
1. the household’s allocation solves the maximization problem in (7),
2. the final goods producing firm solves the maximization in problem (8),
3. the fuel-producing firm solves the problem in (9),
4. the fuel and capital markets clear.
5. the government budget constraint (10) is satisfied, and
6. the state of health satisfies (2).
3 Calibration
For policy purposes it is crucial to understand how all relevant economic
variables respond to changes in the policy instruments. Without imposing
any further structure on the model, we cannot derive any (numerical) re-
sults and hence cannot determine the economic effects of policy reform. We
therefore choose particular functional forms and parameter values so that the
equilibrium in our model matches data for the US economy.
For the utility function, we need to choose a functional form that allows
us to match the observed income and price elasticities for household fuel
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demand. In most standard utility functions, such as Cobb-Douglas or CES,
the implied income elasticity is unity, but typical estimates of this elasticity
are much lower. To allow for varying income elasticities we pick the following
utility function:
u(ct,mct;ht) =
1
1− σ (h
η
t (θc
ξ
t + (1− θ)mρct)1−η)1−σ,
ξ > 0, ρ > 0, 0 < θ < 1, 0 < η < 1, σ ≥ 1. (11)
For the production technology we choose a CES production function.
This functional form allows for a response of input use to changes in relative
prices in accordance with microevidence, as will be discussed below. The
production function is given by
f(kpt,mpt) = A[χk
α
pt + (1− χ)mαpt]1/α, A > 0, α < 1, 0 < χ < 1. (12)
The production function for fuel is Cobb-Douglas in one input, capital,
so that
g(kmt) = Ek
ψ
mt, 0 < ψ < 1. (13)
Finally, the relationship between health and pollution is given by
h(zt) = 1/zt. (14)
Given that in our exercise zt will display only small deviations around its
steady state, and that preferences for health are calibrated -as will become
clear below- so that these deviations have a given welfare cost, equation 14
effectively places no restrictions on the results other than those mentioned in
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the previous section, when discussing the general form of the health-pollution
relationship.
We calibrate our model to the US economy. The benchmark parameters
we use are illustrated in Table 1. Calibrating the utility function to long-run
data is a bit tricky since preferences are not homothetic and expenditure
shares do depend upon the level of income. We thus pick preference param-
eters ξ and ρ that match observed income and price elasticities for gasoline
demand at the steady state. Espey [1996] conducts a meta analysis of elastic-
ity estimates for gasoline demand, and reports that estimates are consistent
across estimation methods, with a mean price elasticity of −.53 and a mean
income elasticity of .64.
These preference parameters imply demand behavior that is broadly con-
sistent with other international experience as well. After the introduction of
the eco tax in Germany in 1999 to 2003, gasoline and fuel consumption fell
for four years in a row for the first time, the use of public transport increased
and carbon dioxide emissions were cut by 6 to 7%. According to Hibiki
and Arimura [2005], in Japan nitrogen monoxide pollution was reduced by
about 75% following an increase in the diesel fuel tax. All of this is evidence
that fuel demand is responsive to changes in fuel prices or fuel taxes. It is
this responsiveness that we are trying to capture with our specification of
preferences.
To choose a value for the parameter η we rely on a large literature on the
valuation of environmental quality. The purpose of this literature is to assess
14
the households’ marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for a decrease in the
pollution levels. A first approach, pioneered by Ridker and Henning [1967] is
based on the observation that differences in pollution levels across commu-
nities can be used to identify -via differences in property values- the value
assigned to a better environmental quality. In a recent paper, Smith and
Huang [1995] presents results of a number of studies that use this approach,
summarized in table 2. The authors report that the distribution of MWTP
for a reduction in Total Suspended Particulate (TSP) is highly skewed, with
the mean being nearly five times the median (109.90 vs. 22.40 1983 dollars).
A different approach uses contingent valuation methods to assess MWTP
for improvements in pollution levels. Brookshire et al. [1982] shows that
property value premia should always exceed MWTP measures derived from
contingent valuation methods, and finds empirical support for this result. In
this paper, we will use the results reported by Smith and Huang [1995]. To
be useful for our purposes, these results need to be converted in a format
interpretable as a x% reduction in consumption being equivalent to a y% im-
provement in air quality. To convert the reported MWTP into a % reduction
in consumption, we use the model real interest rate of 4.5% to annuitize the
MWTP, and express it in percentage of mean US disposable household in-
come for 1983. We then convert ’marginal’ reductions in TSP into percentage
changes by using mean levels of TSP for a sample of 18 cities 1 (Smith and
1Although the focus in this paper is on pollution by CO2, results in Brookshire et al.
[1982] provide strong evidence that behavioral responses to TSP and CO2 are highly
correlated
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Huang [1995], table 3). We find that households are willing to pay an annuity
of .014% of their income in exchange for a .56% permanent improvement in
air pollution levels.
Using this information, η is selected such that households are indifferent
between a 1% steady state reduction in air quality and a .025% steady state
reduction in consumption of market goods. This ratio is consistent with
the estimated benefits from air pollution reduction reported in Bender et al.
[1980], of 708 to 1,781 US$ for a 10% reduction (720 US$ in our model, for
a comparable reduction).
For the elasticity of substitution (ES) parameter, α, we follow the litera-
ture on capital-energy substitution. A large body of research has attempted
to identify the degree of substitutability between capital and energy after the
first oil crisis (see Kemfert and Welsch [2000] for an estimate for Germany in
the context of CO2 reductions and Apostolakis [1990] for a review). When
estimating the Hicksian elasticity of substitution, cross section data usually
suggests that capital and energy are substitutes, while panel datasets pro-
vides evidence of complementarity. Thompson and Taylor [1995] provide a
brief survey of the literature, and argue that Hicksian elasticities of substi-
tution are inherently difficult to identify in this problem. They show that
the Morishima elasticity of substitution provides consistent estimates across
different datasets. These estimates are almost all positive (98%, compared
to 70% for Hicksian elasticities), with a mean of .76 and a variance of .25,
16
making energy and capital Morishima substitutes 2.
Data on output and consumption show that fuel usage by household out
of total usage is 30% 3 fuel share of GNP is 7% 4, and household’s expen-
diture share for fuel is about 3.5 percent 5. The preference and technology
parameters {E,A, θ, χ} are chosen to approximate these shares.
We know very little about the technology parameter ψ. We execute some
sensitivity analysis and find that our qualitative results are robust to changes
in ψ. We assume that the depreciation rate for capital is 4%, and a high rate
of depreciation for pollution (δz) of .8, consistent with our focus on CO2
emissions.
The Statistical Abstract of the United States 1999, table 793 shows that
state gasoline taxes averaged 19 cents a gallon in 1996. Together with a
federal gasoline tax of 18.4 cents, and given that before tax gasoline prices
were 74 cents a gallon, the average tax rate for gasoline is around 50%.
2The Morishima elasticity of substitution is − 1α−1 , while the Hicksian measure has a
more cumbersome form, but its sign is given by the sign of αα−1 . If we use a Morishima ES
of .76 for the calibration, capital and fuel are then also Hicks substitutes, in accordance
with most of the evidence drawn from cross-section data
3The Statistical Abstract of the United States 1999, table 955 contains data on fuel use
which is broken down into the following categories: residential and commercial, industrial,
and transportation. We assign 50 percent of fuel use in the residential and commercial
category to fuel use in consumption. Over the period from 1970 - 1997, households used
30.75 percent of all fuel.
4According to the Statistical Abstract of the United States table 958 and table 727,
expenditure on fuel as a fraction of GDP in the US for 1995 is about 7%.
5This is slightly lower than the average share of household income allocated to fuel
estimated by Chernick and Reschovsky [1997].
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4 Results
This section contains the heart of our plicy analysis. We study how changes in
gasoline taxes influence welfare via changes in all relevant economic variables
taking all general equilibrium interactions into consideration.
We begin by reporting the results of our main experiment 6, a revenue
neutral tax change. In this experiment, we raise the fuel tax and adjust the
capital tax to keep the government share of GDP constant at 35%. For ease
of exposition, we concentrate first on steady-state comparisons, and examine
the transition path later.
Figure 1 shows fuel usage in steady state as the tax on fuel increases
for the baseline parametrization. Although it is not evident from looking at
it, this figure shows a steady state level of aggregate fuel consumption that
is not monotonic in the tax rate on fuel. In fact, fuel use by household is
monotonically declining in the tax rate, as the substitution effect dominates
the income effect because of similar magnitudes of the price and income
elasticities, but larger increase in the steady state relative price of fuel (price
change) with respect to the increase in the capital stock (income change).
Fuel use by firms, however, increases in the green tax rate, since higher
tax rates on fuel are accompanied by lower capital tax rates, and therefore
higher steady state levels of the capital stock. When the fuel tax rate is low
6To solve this model, we first obtain the steady state using a Newton-Raphson proce-
dure, then we linearize the first-order conditions around the steady state and solve the
resulting difference equations. The approximation errors that result are very small, with
the euler residuals uc(t)uc(t+1)β(1+rt+1−δ) − 1 being of the order of 10−6.
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(high), the former (latter) effect tends to dominate 7, giving a hump shaped
relationship between tax rates and aggregate fuel usage.
The steady state levels of the capital stock as τm changes are depicted
in figure 2. While the amount of capital devoted to fuel production stays
roughly constant, as τm increases and the tax on capital income is reduced,
capital in the final goods producing sector increases until the after tax rate
of return on capital equals the subjective rate of preference.
We now examine the transition path for all variables after the tax on
fuel τm increases from the baseline level of .5 to .55. Figures 4 to 5 show
the transition path from period 11 (time 1), when the policy change occurs.
At time 1, the higher tax rate on fuel generates, via a substitution effect, a
sharp decrease in fuel consumption (figure 3). The lower tax rate on capital
earnings, however, creates incentives to accumulate capital (figure 4). Since
fuel is an input in the production of the capital good, fuel consumption
by firms increases monotonically from time 1 (period 11). As capital is
accumulated however, decreasing returns to capital in the fuel producing
sector implies that the relative price of fuel must increase, so household
consumption of fuel further decreases from time 1 on.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of GDP and consumption of the final good.
At the time the policy change takes place and the rate of return to capital
jumps, more capital is devoted to investment, and consumption of the final
good must be sacrificed for a period of about 15 years (years 11-35 in figure 5).
7Aggregate fuel consumption peaks at a fuel tax rate of 90%.
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We now turn to the welfare effects of this policy experiment. To disentan-
gle welfare changes from different consumption paths and different pollution
stock paths, a measure of compensating variation is used. We first com-
pute the level of discounted utility during the transition to the new steady
state, assuming that households enjoy the levels of health of the original
steady state. We then calculate by what percentage should consumption (of
both fuel and the final good) decrease along the transition path for both dis-
counted utilities (original steady state and transition) to be equal, and label
this number the efficiency dividend. Next, we do the same exercise but now
holding consumption at the level of the original steady state, and comparing
discounted utilities where only the stock of health changes. We label this
second number the green dividend. Finally, a measure of aggregate welfare
change is computed along the same lines.
Table 3 shows these welfare measures for the baseline case, where τm
increases from .5 to .55, as well as for alternative tax changes and different
calibrations. Note that both dividends are always obtained under reasonable
parameter values. The efficiency dividend decreases monotonically with the
tax rate on fuel, and becomes negative at high levels of τm (above 150%
for the baseline calibration). When simulating a similar policy experiment,
Goulder [1995a] reports a negative efficiency dividend, but Jorgenson and
Wilcoxen [1993a] finds that output actually increases, in line with our results.
With respect to the green dividend, we are not aware of previous work that
attempts to measure it, and we find that it is always positive for all reasonable
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parameter values 8, even though environmental quality is likely to be lower at
the new steady state, and is certainly lower for all policy changes considered
in table 3. The reason why we find positive green dividends across the board
is of course that the transition dynamics are very slow, with a half life of
about 300 years in the baseline model. To make sense of this result, we
should keep in mind that in the data this transition occurs around a balanced
growth path, so it is not at odds with the observed growth rates of gasoline
consumption in the US.
Since we have calibrated preferences for pollution to be consistent with
the evidence, the size of green and efficiency dividends can be compared. The
striking feature of table 3 is of course that green dividends are always very
small, and much smaller (by about 85% in the baseline case), than efficiency
dividends, so that aggregate welfare change can always be approximated by
welfare changes from the consumption of market goods. We may question
whether this result is sensible. After all, environmental concerns seem to be
high on the public policy agenda, as well as in people’s perceptions of what
matters for quality of life. The point is that, while there is consensus that a
cleaner environment is a desirable policy goal, there is strong evidence that
actual willingness to pay for a better environmental quality is very low, as
shown consistently by the literature reviewed in the previous section.
Summarizing, even though in steady state comparisons the efficiency div-
8When the elasticity of substitution becomes close to zero,the Leontief case, we find
that the green dividend actually disappears.
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idend always holds, and the green dividend is in doubt, both types of welfare
gains will be obtained when transition dynamics are accounted for. More-
over, green dividends are always smaller than efficiency dividends, and very
small in absolute terms, so that aggregate welfare effects will likely be well
approximated by the efficiency dividend.
5 Conclusion
In this apper we have studied whether a modest increase in a green tax -
the gasoline tax- is desirable. We have done this in the context of a dynamic
model that allows to track all general equilibrium effects. We have calibrated
the model to the US economy so as to obtain reasonable quantitative effects.
Our analysis also delivers an answer to the question of whether a green tax
reform can deliver a double dividend. The answer is yes.
In our model, raising a green tax does indeed allow a pre-existing tax to
be decreased, here a tax on capital income. Cutting the highly distortionary
capital taxes does reduce the deadweight loss from the tax system given
current tax levels, so green tax reform does yield one dividend. If fuel is an
input in the production of capital, however, increasing the capital stock raises
the demand for fuel which may offset any decline in fuel use due to higher fuel
taxes. While this offsetting effect is important in steady state comparisons, it
is dwarfed by substitution effects that decrease the consumption of fuel and
thus deliver a better environmental quality for a very long period along the
transition path. This result certainly depends on the elasticity of substitution
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in production between capital and energy. If this elasticity of production were
to be substantially smaller than the value we use in our model, this result
may be overturned. For the estimates available for the US economy, however,
the green dividend is indeed achieved.
It is worth noting that given the low value that households show for the
quality of the environment, the size of this welfare gain (the green dividend) is
very small in absolute terms, and much smaller than the efficiency dividend.
Reconsidering Bovenberg’s citation in the introduction of this paper, our
results suggest that the green dividend may not be after all a strong argument
in favor of the implementation of green tax policy reform. Our analysis
does suggest however that policymakers who are contemplating a green tax
reform should give serious consideration to how the extra revenue should be
recycled. In our paper the largest pre existing tax distortion is a tax on
capital income. The welfare gains of green tax reform from being able to
correct this particular distortion are large.
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Table 1: Benchmark parameters and data
Preference parameters
β 0.979
σ 3
θ 0.925
η 0.011
ξ 0.453
ρ 0.145
Technology parameters
Final good production
A .12
α −0.32
χ 0.98
Fuel production
E .9
ψ 0.3
Depreciation rate
δ 0.041
δz 0.8
Data
mc
mc+mp
0.3
wm/GNP 0.07
w(1+τm)mc
c+i+(1+τm)wmc
.035
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Table 2: MWTP in selected studies (from Table 1 in Smith and Huang [1995])
Study Year of data Location MWTP Range
(1982-1984 US$)
Highest 5 MWTP
Ega [1973] 1960 Hartford 1,612 to 1,807.8
Nelson [1978] 1970 Washington 0 to 1,522
Brookshire et al. [1979] 1977 Southern Cal.
Air Basin
577.2
Jackson [1979] 1970 Milwaukee 551.4
Brucato et al. [1990] 1978 San Francisco 500.2
Lowest 5 MWTP
Berry [1976] 1968 Chicago −1.38
Li and Brown [1980] 1971 Chicago 2.7 to 10.8
Krumm [1980] 1971 Chicago 29
Anderson and Crocker [1971] 1960 Kansas City 16.4 to 31.6
Anderson and Crocker [1971] 1960 St. Louis 17 to 32.7
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Table 3: Welfare analysis: Compensating variation (% of consumption)
Calibration Efficiency
dividend
Green
dividend
Aggregate
welfare
change
Baseline
τm from .5 to .55 .15 .02 .17
Baseline, alternative tax changes
τm from .35 to .4 .22 .02 .24
τm from .4 to .45 .19 .02 .21
τm from .45 to .5 .17 .02 .19
τm from .55 to .6 .13 .02 .15
Sensitivity analysis (τm from .5 to .55)
η : MWTP is 2 times
the baseline
.15 .04 .19
α : ES is .65 (.76-2SD) .23 .02 .25
α : ES is .87 (.76+2SD) .08 .02 .1
ψ = .1 .24 .01 .25
ψ = .5 .05 .03 .08
δz = .1 .15 .02 .16
δz = .99 .15 .02 .17
σ = 1 .19 .07 .32
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Figure 1: Steady state comparisons: fuel
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Figure 2: Steady state comparisons: capital
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Figure 3: Transition path: fuel
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Figure 4: Transition path: capital
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Figure 5: Transition path: GDP and final goods consumption
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